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Abstract
We study a mathematical model for revenue management under competitions with multiple sellers.
The model combines the stochastic knapsack problem, a classic revenue management model, with
a non-coorperative game model that characterizes the sellers’ rational behavior. We are able to
establish a dynamic recursive procedure that incorporate the value function with the utility function
of the games. The formalization of the dynamic recursion allows us to establish some fundamental
structural properties.
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1. Introduction
A key model in revenue (yield) management is the following, a seller needs to sell a fixed amount of
certain commodity before a fixed deadline to different buyers with individual price they are willing
to pay, and the seller can dynamically adjust the selling price to maximize his/her overall revenue
over time. Stochastic knapsack problem, also known as stochastic dynamic knapsack problem,
a mathematical problem that captures the essences of this model, quantifies some of the most
fundamental trade-offs in revenue management, and serves as an important building block for
1
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more complex and sophisticated models for real life applications. Consequently, the stochastic
(dynamic) knapsack problem and its variations have been studied extensively, see, e.g., Gallego
and van Ryzin (1994), Bitran and Mondschein (1995), Feng and Gallego (1995), Papastavrou et al.
(1996), Feng and Gallego (2000), Feng and Xiao (2000), Van Slyke and Young (2000), Zhao and
Zheng (2000), and Lin et al. (2008). It is one of the fundamental models surveyed in Den Boer
(2015); please refer to that paper for more details, as well as references.
It is natural to ask the question of what would happen if there are multiple sellers competing for the
same demand stream from the buyers. In this paper, we generalize the classic stochastic knapsack
problem, and formulate a mathematical model to capture the basic relations in this situation. An
immediate goal is to formulate a dynamic recursion for calculating the optimal policies for sellers. In the single seller case, this is accomplished through the formulation of a dynamic program
that computes the maximum expected revenue starting at any time with any amount of remaining
inventory. However, in the case of multiple sellers, at each time period, the sellers’ decisions are
inter-dependent. It is, therefore, not a trivial task to decide what will be the next best action even
if every seller has the same forecast of the future demand arrivals. Another difficulty is that when
multiple sellers are willing to sell the product, the buyer can have different ways to choose one
of them to fulfill the demand, the difference in these selection rules has significant impact on the
evolution of the system. To overcome these difficulties, we model the sellers as rational individual
or institutions, and introduce a non-cooperative game at each step of the dynamic recursion characterizing their behavior. Furthermore, we follow a static probabilistic selection rule, which will be
described precisely later, that the buyer will use to select sellers. This selection rule, on one hand,
reflects market power of the sellers, on the other hand, it allows the uncertainty that is natural in
business reality. With this mechanism, the utility functions of the games are properly connected
with the value functions of the dynamic recursion, thus help to identify pure strategy Nash equilibriums. Under the selection rule assumed, we are able to demonstrate that there is a unique Nash
equilibrium of the game. In turn, assuming that the Nash equilibriums will be the strategy followed by all the sellers at each step, the dynamic recursion is able to proceed. Once establishing
the dynamic recursion, we are able to extend the arguments that are effective for the single seller
dynamic programming, and demonstrate that, in some cases, the value function exhibits remarkable rich monotonicity properties that provide insights to key trade-offs to the problem and can be
helpful to dynamic pricing in practice. A related but different model is considered in Gallego and
Hu (2014), it is concluded that, under a differential game setting, the equilibrium structure enjoys
simple structural properties. While the model studied here is quite different, but results are similar
in spirit.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follow. In Section 2, we will introduce the basic mathematical models, and review preliminaries including some basic concepts in game theory that will
be needed for our analysis. In Section 3, we will discuss in details the dynamic recursion in which
the game aspect of the problem is incorporated. In Sections 4 and 5, we establish some fundamental structural properties of the value functions of the dynamic recursion. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 6 with a summary of our findings.
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2. Models and Preliminaries
2.1. Model Descriptions
Suppose that there are N sellers, and each seller n, n = 1, 2, . . . , N , has an initial inventory of Cn
units of product ( could be either goods or services) at the beginning of a common selling horizon.
The selling horizon is discrete and of length T < ∞. At each time t = 1, 2, . . . , T , demand for
one unit of the product will emerge, and the buyer will post a price that he/she is willing to pay. To
accommodate the event of no arrival, we can always include a class of demand with exceedingly
low price. The sellers who have positive inventory need to decide whether they should accept
or reject this demand. The buyer will then select one seller among all the sellers that accept the
demand according to certain selection rule, and the selected seller will supply the product and
collect the revenue. At the end of the selling horizon, all the remaining product will be savaged.
The goal for each seller is to maximize his/her expected revenue.
We assume that each seller does not have the information of the exact value of the initial inventory
of other sellers, but has a distributional estimation of that quantity. We also assume that the distributional information of the future demand price is given to each seller, and no seller has any extra
knowledge. In particular, we assume that the price of the demand realization at each period follow
an independent and identically distributed discrete probability distribution P , with P[P = pi ] = θi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , I.
Suppose that, at each time t, when the demand is of class i, i,e. the price is pi , a subset of sellers,
denoted by At (i) (which can be shortened to At when there is no ambiguity), will accept the
demand, decided based on the remaining time, demand type, remaining inventory and the selling
history up to time t. The buyer will select only one seller among them, which means that there
is a possibility that no seller is selected. There could be various selection rule models reflecting
different market mechanisms, for example, a static rule (the buyer chooses one product over the
other overwhelmingly, which happens often in some local and monopoly market) and weighted
rule (buyer assigns weights to the each product, then randomly, with probabilities determined by
the weights, select ones that are available). In this paper, we will focus on a P
random allocation
rule with static probabilities: each seller is associated with a probability πn , N
n=1 πn = 1. At
eachP
time, if a seller accepts, the probability of it being selected is always πn , and with probability
1 − n∈At (i) πn , no one is selected.
At each time t, the phenomenon that the sellers are making independent decisions based on distributional information on the other sellers can be best modeled by a non coorperative strategic game,
see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).

3.

A Dynamic Recursion Formulation

Our goal is to identify a strategy for a seller to achieve the best outcome, in terms of average
revenue, under a reasonable assumption on other sellers’ behavior. Recall that each seller n, n =
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1, 2, . . . , N with initial inventory Cn is also given the distributional information of the inventory
of all other sellers, either though statistical forecast or other business information inquiry, and any
two sellers will be given the exact same distribution on the third seller. In addition, all the sellers
do observe all the sells outcomes up to each decision time epoch, i.e., they know the amount each
seller sold so far. It is our intention to derive a dynamic recursion for calculating the best outcome,
hence the optimal strategy for each seller. Equivalently, given s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sN ) representing
the amount of inventory has been sold so far by each seller, we seek to calculate vn (t, dn , s),
n = 1, 2, . . . , N , the maximum expected revenue seller n can collect starting from time t and with
remaining inventory dn , for any time t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
We assume that the behavior of the sellers is modeled as a N -person game, and if sellers follow
the Nash Equilibriums at each time period, a dynamic recursion can proceed. This will be argued
inductively. At the last time period T , given a price realization, pi , there are two strategies for each
seller, accept or reject. The utility function of the game for seller n will be the expected revenue
collected by taking either action. If reject, of course, there is no revenue. It is clear that, if the
random selection rule with static probabilities is followed, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium,
that is, every seller will accept, as long as they have a positive inventory. In this case, the value
function vn (T, d) has the following form, vn (T, d) = πn E[P ], where πn are the probabilities in the
section rule model.
Now, suppose that we can calculate recursively all the value function vn (t+1, dn , s) for any feasible
s, we demonstrate that there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium at time period t, and
show how it is related to the calculation of the value function for time t, vn (t, dn , s). There are
two actions for each seller, accept or reject. The payoff function will be the expected revenue to be
collected until time T . Therefore, the seller will consider the following balance inequality, whose
left hand side (LHS) represents the price we get immediately, and right hand side (RHS) represents
the future reward,
p ≥ En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s) − vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en )],

(3.1)

where En,t is the expectation with respect to the information available at time t for seller n, p the
generic price the class indicator is suppressed when there is no ambiguity). If (3.1) holds, then the
order will be accepted. Otherwise, if we have,
p < En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s) − vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en )],

(3.2)

the order will be rejected.
Remark 3.1.
The operator En,t can be treated in a way as an conditional expectation, the information update
each time is basically the confirmation that the random variable of each seller’s inventory is larger
than the cumulative sales, which is updated at the end of each time period.
Proposition 3.1.
The above defined strategy is a unique Nash Equilibrium.
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Proof:
To prove that it is a Nash Equilibrium, let us discuss separately for those sellers depends upon their
decisions. Suppose that for a particular seller n, the action is to accept, three events can happen,
• sell n is selected, with probability πn ;
• some other seller j in At is selected, with probability πj ;
P
• no seller is selected, with probability 1 − At πi .
Sum them up, the pay-off function has the following form,
X
πn En,t [p + vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s)] +
πj En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s + ej )]
j6=n,j∈At

!
+

1−

X

πi

En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)].

At

If seller n deviates from the strategy, i.e., rejects the demand, its payoff will be,


X
X
πj En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s + ej )] + 1 −
πi  En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)].
At −{n}

j6=n,j∈At

From the equation (3.1), we know that seller n could not be better off.
In the case seller n reject, the pay off is,



X

πj En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s + ej )] + 1 −

X

πi  En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s + ej )].

At −{n}

j6=n,j∈At

If the seller deviates from this strategy, the pay-off will become,
X
πn [p + En,t [vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s)]] +
πj En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s + ej )]
j6=n,j∈At

!
+

1−

X

πi

En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)].

At

However, we know that p + En,t [vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s)] < En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)], therefore, the seller
will be worse off.
Suppose any other strategy that has a seller n, such that, p+vn (t+1, dn −1, s+en ) < vn (t+1, dn s),
but seller n accepts the demand. We can see that deviation will lead to better pay-off. Meanwhile
if there is a seller n with p + vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en ) ≥ vn (t + 1, dn , s), but seller n rejects, a
deviation will lead to higher pay-off.
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The above arguments allow us to present the following dynamic recursion for the value function,
vn (t, dn , s) =

I
X

θi wn (t + 1, dn , s, pi ),

(3.3)

i=1
N
X

wn (t + 1, dn , s, pi ) = 1 −

!
πm

En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)] + pi πn 1An

m=1

+

N
X

πm [vn (t + 1, dn , s + em )1Am

m=1

+ En,t [vn (t + 1, dn + s)1An ],
vN (T, dn , s) =πN E[p],

(3.4)
(3.5)

with An := {En,t [vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en ) + pi ] ≥ En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)}.
Remark 3.2.
The information available at time t is on the distribution on the initial capacity of all the other sellers, as well as the sales records in the past period. At time t + 1, the sales records will be amended
with what happened during time period t, the distribution inform hence is naturally updated. For
example, if the original distributional estimation is D, and at time t, the total sales has been s, then
that information should be updated to D; D ≥ s. At time t, if there are sales by that seller, it should
be updated to D; D ≥ s + 1, otherwise, it will stay at D; D ≥ s.

4.

Monotonicity of the Value Functions and its Implications in Revenue
Management

In this section, we will establish monotonicity properties of the value function vn (t, dn , s), based on
the dynamic recursion formulated in Section 3. The main result is stated in the following theorem,
and its proof is presented in Section 5.
Theorem 4.1.
Under the random selection rule with static probabilities, the value function of the knapsack problem vn (t, dn , s) for the n-th seller satisfies the following monotonicity properties.
(i) Monotone in inventory d, i.e., En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s) ≥ En,t−1 [vn (t, dn − 1, s)];
(ii) Monotone in selling amount of competitors,
En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s)] ≤ En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s + ei )];
(iii) Monotone in time t, i.e., En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s)] ≥ En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)];
(iv) Second order relationship with respect to dn , i.e.,
En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s) − vn (t, dn − 1, s + en )]
≥En,t−1 [vn (t, dn + 1, s) − vn (t, dn , s + en )];
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(v) Second order relationship with respect to t, i.e.,
En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s)] − En,t−1 [vn (t, dn − 1, s + en )]
≥ En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s)] − En,t [vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en )];

(4.2)

(vi) Second order relationship with respect to s, i.e.,
En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s)] − En,t−1 [vn (t, dn − 1, s + en )]
≥ En,t−1 [vn (t, dn , s − em )] + En,t−1 [vn (t, dn − 1, s + en − em )],

(4.3)

with m 6= n.
Proof:
See the proof in Section 5.



From the above theorem, we can draw the following conclusions on the optimal policy.
Corollary 4.1.
For each individual seller, his/her total average revenue is a monotone decrease function of his/her
competitors inventory surplus levels.
Proof:
At any time t, given the the amount of remaining inventory being dn , and s, the total average
revenue for seller n takes the function form vn (t, dn , s) by definition. Property (ii) in Theorem 4.1
implies that vn (t, dn , s) is a component-wise monotone increasing function of the selling quantity s,
therefore, vn (t, dn , s) is a component-wise monotone decreasing function of the inventory surplus
of his/her competitors.

Remark 4.1.
It is apparent that the more the overall supply is, the less is the expected marginal gain for each
individual unit.
Corollary 4.2.
If it is optimal for a seller to accept the at certain point, then it is also optimal to accept when the
competitors have more inventory.
Proof:
Recall that a seller checks the blance inequality (3.1), i.e., whether the price will be above the
quantity En,t [vn (t + 1, dn , s) − vn (t + 1, dn − 1, s + en )] to decide whether to accept or reject.
Property (iv) in Theorem 4.1 says that this quantity decreases when the competitors have more
inventory. Therefore, if it is optimal for a seller to accept the at certain point, then it is also optimal
to accept when the competitors have more inventory.
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Remark 4.2.
The intuition is that when there are more inventory in the hands of the competitors, they will be
more aggressive, and it will then lower a seller’s expected marginal gain. Thus, the seller will be
more likely to accept a lower price.
Corollary 4.3.
The quantity En,t−1 [vn (t, d, s)] − En,t−1 [vn (t, d − 1, s + en )] is a decreasing function of t, and a
increasing function of each coordinate of s.
Proof:
The monotonicity with respect to t holds because of (4.2), which is the main conclusion of property (v) in Theorem 4.1. Meanwhile, inequality (4.3) in property (vi) confirms that the quantity
En,t−1 [vn (t, d, s)] − En,t−1 [vn (t, d − 1, s + en )] decreases when s is replaced by s − em for any
m 6= n.

Remark 4.3.
Here, it is understood that a lower selling amount of his/her competitors will make a seller less
likely to accept a fixed price; conversely, a higher selling amount will make the same seller more
likely to accept the same price. Intuitively, observing more sells from ones competitors will make
a seller more aggressive. Similarly, approaching the selling deadline will also make a seller to be
more aggressive.

5.

Proof of Theorem 4.1

Proof:
It is easy to see that (i) and (iii) are trivial. We will prove the rest by backward induction on time
t. First, it is trivial to check all of them at the end of selling season, time T . Next, suppose that
at time period t + 1 and later, the properties (ii) and (iv) through (vi) hold. We want to extend
all the result to time period t. Since selection is based on the static probabilities, to facilitate our
discussion, denote Π0 the event that no seller is selected, and Πi , i = 1, . . . , N , the event that
seller i is selected. From our assumptions, it is clear that the probabilities of these events are
πi , i = 0, 1, . . . , N , respectively. Furthermore, since all the demand random variables are i.i.d, it is
suffice to focus on the event that the price of the demand is pi , i = 1, . . . , N . We will use a generic
notation p to denote the price, for the ease of exposition.

Validity of (ii)
Recall that, we need to establish Ei,t−1 [vi (t, di , s)] ≤ Ei,t−1 [vi (t, di , s + ej )], for j 6= i. Without
loss of generality, it suffices to show, E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s)] ≤ E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s + ej )], for any j > 1.
We will argue that the inequality holds on each event Πi , i = 0, 1, . . . , N . On Π0 , since no seller is
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selected, it is easy to see that the inequality holds by induction, and the induction arguments also
applies to Πi , i 6= 1 and i 6= j. On Π1 , examine what happens at time t, the only case that is not
straightforward is that seller one only accept given that the history is s but reject when it is s + ej .
In this case, the left hand side (LHS) of the inequality becomes E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 )] + p. By
induction, it is less than or equal to E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 + ej )] + p. Meanwhile, E1,t [v1 (t +
1, d1 − 1, s + ej + e1 ))] + p ≤ E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s + ej )] due to the fact that this demand is not
accepted when the history is s + ej . Hence, the inequality follows. On Πj , j > 1, there are two
cases need to be considered depending on whether seller j accepts the demand. Case I, seller j only
accepts when the history is s not when it is s + ej . In this case, we have both the LHS and the right
hand side (RHS) equal to E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s + ej )]. Case II, seller j accepts in both cases. Then,
the desired inequality is a consequence of E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s + e1 )] ≤ E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s + 2e1 )],
which is the consequence of induction.

Validity of (iv)
Without loss of generality, we only need to show,
E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s)] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 − 1, s + e1 )]
≥E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 + 1, s)] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s + e1 )].
Let us first consider case by case based on whether demand will be accepted by seller one. From
the induction assumption for time t + 1, we know that there are only the following cases,
I. the demand is only accepted when the inventory is at d1 + 1 not when it is d1 ;
II. the demand is accepted when the inventory levels are at both d1 + 1 and d1 ;
III. the demand is rejected in either case.
And we will discuss each case for events Π0 , Π1 and Πj , j > 1.
In Case I, on event Π0 , the inequality follows from induction, i.e., the concavity with respect to the
inventory, at time t + 1. On the event Π1 , the LHS becomes E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s) − v1 (t + 1, d1 −
1, s + e1 )], and the RHS becomes p, then the inequality follows because the balance inequality is
violated, which is exactly the reason the demand is not accepted when the inventory is at (d1 , s). On
Πj , j ≥ 2, since the decision of seller j will not depend on the actual amount of inventory seller one
has, but just the distribution, the RHS becomes, E1,t [v1 (t+1, d1 +1, s+ej )−v1 (t+1, d1 , s+ej +e1 )].
Hence, the inequality will follow from the concavity with respect to inventory from time t + 1 due
to induction assumption.
In Case II, again, we only need to look at event Π1 , where the LHS becomes p and the RHS
becomes E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s) − v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 )], and the inequality follows from the balance
inequality. Finally, in Case III, the inequality follows from induction.
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Validity of (v)
Again, we need to show that,
E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s)] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 − 1, s + e1 )]
≥E1,t−1 [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s)] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 )].
We will examine the inequality on each event Πi , i = 0, 1, . . . , N . On Π0 , the inequality follows
directly from the induction assumption. On Π1 , let us consider three subcases. First, it is again a
straightforward conclusion from the induction assumption if the demand is not accepted for either
inventory level. On the other hand if it is accepted for both inventory levels, then the inequality
holds due to the induction assumption on the validity of (4) at time t and t + 1. If seller one only
accepts when the inventory level is at d1 , but not when it is at d1 − 1, the LHS will become p, then
by the condition of accept, i.e., the balance inequality, it is larger than the RHS. On Πj , j ≥ 2,
the inequality follows from the induction assumption on (6) if the demand is accepted for both
inventory levels. By the distributional assumption, that is all that needs to be considered.

Validity of (vi)
It is our task to show that, for j ≥ 2,
E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s)] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 − 1, s + e1 )]
≥ E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 , s − ej )] − E1,t−1 [v1 (t, d1 − 1, s − ej + e1 )].
On the event Π1 , we know that, by induction assumption, we only need to consider the case that
the seller one accepts the demand when the inventory level is at d1 , but not when it is at d1 − 1. In
this case, the LHS becomes p. For the RHS, consider the two cases that seller one accepts in both
cases and only accepts when the inventory is d1 but not d1 − 1. In the first case, it becomes
E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s − ej + e1 )] − E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 2, s − ej + e1 )].
Then the inequality follows from the condition that the seller accepts when the inventory and
history is (d1 − 1, s − ej ). In the second case, both the LHS and RHS become p. Now for the event
Πj , again, the one non-trivial case is similar. Hence, the LHS becomes,
E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s + ej )] − E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + ej + e1 )]
≥ E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 , s)] − E1,t [v1 (t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 )],
and the inequality thus follows by induction.
This concludes the proof.



6. Conclusions
In this paper, we extended the classic stochastic knapsack problem to model competitions between
several sellers and effects on their dynamic pricing decisions. By utilizing dynamic programming
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techniques, together with a game theoretical model on the sellers’ behavior, we are able to identify
a simple strategy, i.e., checking the balance inequality, for each seller, and a dynamic recursion
for calculating the value functions required. Furthermore, we showed that the value functions have
several important first and second order monotonicity properties that are of important theoretical
values and critical practical implications.
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